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are thinking
of the end which the law serves, and fitting its rules to the task of
73
service.

The trend of ]udicial interpretation of the Califorma automobile guest statute has
followed this pattern. The courts, through the process of broadening the definition
of wilful misconduct, have nearly rendered nugatory the 1931 amendment to the
guest statute, which eliminated gross negligence as a basis of recovery. This would
seem to be a desirable result. Since guest statutes are m derogation of a common
law right, it would seem more proper that the derogation, rather than merely the
terminology of the statute, be strictly construed. On the other hand there is the
problem of whether courts in a democratic society have the right to construe a
statute so strictly as to emasculate it. The "correct" solution to this dilemma depends upon the philosophy of law adhered to by the critic. 74
Richard S.Berger*
73 CAiozo, op.
74 Id. at 153-55

cit. supra note 54, at 149.
and 165-66 n.25.
* Member, Second Year Class.

FAIR COMMENT AND FAIR MISTAKE-EXTENSION OF THE
SULLIVAN PRECEDENT TO OTHER MATTERS OF PUBLIC
INTEREST
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the privilege of commenting upon the activities of public officials includes the privilege of making an honest
misstatement of fact. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1 was handed down,
state and federal courts have attempted to define the scope of this privilege. Inasmuch as liberal interpretations of Sullivan might affect significant changes in the
law of defamation it is appropriate at this time to review the cases which have
construed Sullivan, examine the present limitations of the privilege of fair comment
in other matters of public concern, and consider the possible extensions of Sullivan
to comment upon the works and public activities of authors, entertainers, and public figures who do not hold public office and to other matter affected with a public
interest.
Sullivan
In the Sullivan case the Court reversed a judgment m favor of the Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama for the publication of an advertisement2 in the New York Times which allegedly defamed Sullivan in his official
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 A copy of the advertisement is printed m an appendix to the decision, 376 U.S.

at 292.
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capacity.3 The Court based its decision upon the need to encourage free political
discussion 4 and stated that, as "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate," it
too "must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing
space' that they 'need
to survive.'"-5 The Court limited its decision to a restnetion of a states power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct.6
Prior to Sullivan, the prevailing state rule had been that the privilege of commenting upon the activities of public officials in their official capacity did not extend to a false statement of fact. 7 A minority of states had extended the privilege
to cover false statements of fact s on the ground that the public interest is best
served by protecting "honest," false statements in order that those who would expose information of public interest not be deterred by fear of suit. 9 In vindicating
the minority rule the Sullivan Court relied upon a variety of sources of authority.
Numerous prior Supreme Court decisions were cited, 0 as were the decisions of
some of the state courts which had earlier extended the privilege to include false
assertions of fact."1 It was also noted by the Court that the consensus of scholarly
opinion apparently favors the rule which it was adopting.12
While the Sullivan holding was restricted solely to the safeguards constitutionally required "in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of Ins
3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
4 376 U.S. at 269.
5id. at 272.
old, at 283. (Emphasis added.)
7
Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959); Moore v. Booth Pub.
Co., 216 Mich. 653, 185 N.W 780 (1921) (mayor); Kenna v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 250
App. Div. 625, 295 N.Y. Supp. 219 (1937) (policeman); Westbrook v. Houston Chronice Pub. Co., 129 Tex. 95, 102 S.W.2d 197 (1937) (state legislator); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943) (road commissioner). See also
Boyer, Fair Comment, 15 Omo ST. L.J. 280 (1954); Hallen, Fatr Comment, 8 TEXAs
L. REV. 41 (1929); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoLum.
L. REv.
875 (1949).
8
See generally, 1 HARpm & JAmS, ToRTs § 5.26 (1956); Pnossm, ToRTs § 110
(3d ed. 1964); Noel, supra note 7, at 896-900. Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal.
565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921) apparently established the minority rule in California; but cf.
Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal. App. 324, 264 Pac. 803 (1928).
9 Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440
(1955); Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W 167 (1922); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 At. 92

(1923).
'O1E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Bridges v. Califorma, 314 U.S. 252
(1941); Stromberg v. Califorma, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Barr v. Matteo, supra, held that
the utterance of a federal officer is absolutely privileged if made "within the outer
perimeter" of his duties, and was cited to show that it would give public servants an
unjustified preference over the public they serve if critics of official conduct did not
have an immunity equivalent to that of officials themselves.
11376 U.S. at 280 n.20. The Supreme Court quoted at length from the leading case
for the minority view, Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
12 376 U.S. at 280 n.20.
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offic al conduct,"'3 the language of the opinion was much broader. The Court
asserted that "freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First
Amendment"'14 and quoted the broad language of Bridges v. Californta'5 that "it
is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with
16
perfect good taste, on all public rstitutions."
Concurring Opinions
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Black,' 7 with whom Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, argued that the Times and the individual defendant had an unconditional
constitutional right to publish their criticism of Montgomery agencies and officials' s
and that the federal constitution protects the press "by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their duty."' 9 Further, Mr.
Justice Black writes that "at the very least" 20 the first amendment guarantees to the
people and the press the right to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with
impunity. Thus he apparently advocates not only an enlargement of the privilege
but also an extension of that privilege beyond the discussion of the public official.
The second concurring opinion, that of Mr. Justice Goldberg,2 ' also argues that
the Constitution affords greater protection for the citizens and press who exercise
their right of public criticism than that provided by the Sullivan ruling. Mr. Justice
Goldberg objected to the retention as unprivileged commentary made with
actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth, 22 and argued that the American
right of free expression about public officials and affairs should not depend upon a
probing by a jury of the motivation of the citizen or press. 28 While Mr. Justice
Goldberg generally speaks only of the criticism of public officials, he quotes from
Mr. Justice Douglas' book, The Right of the People:24 "The imposition of liability
for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of speech.
This of course
cannot be said 'where public officials are concerned or where public matters are
'3 Id. at 264. (Emphasis added.) "We hold that the rule of law applied by the
Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct."

Ibid.
Id. at 269. (Emphasis added.)
15 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
16 Id. at 270. (Emphasis added.) In Sullivan the Court nowhere stated that the
Constitution precludes the extension of the privilege to matters other than criticism
of the official conduct of a public official.
.7 376 U.S. at 293.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 295.
20 Id. at 296.
21
Mr. Justice Douglas also joined in this opinion.
'4

22 376 U.S. at 298.
23 At this point Mr.

Justice Goldberg states in a footnote that "the requirement of
proving actual malice or reckless disregard may, in the mind of the ]ury, add little to the
requirement of proving falsity, a requirement which the Court recognizes not to be an
adequate safeguard." 376 U.S. at 298 n.2.
24
Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion also includes this statement from the
same book: "Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor
of freedom of expression rather than against it." 376 U.S. at 301-02.

NOTES

December, 1965]

involved."' This poses a question as to what "public matters" might be protected
by expansion of the Sullivan precedent.
Fair Comment
It is agreed that there is a right or privilege of comment and criticism in matters
of public interest and general concern. 25 In addition to the official activities of public officers, 26 the protection of the "fair comment" doctrine extends to public per-

formances and exhibitions, 27 or to anything else inviting public attention, such as
books28 or articles. 29 The privilege of fair comment actually seems to be divided
into two different and distinct privileges.30 One, dealing with comment upon the
official conduct of public officers, public institutions and related affairs of a political nature, might be called the "public interest" pnvilege. The other, dealing with
comment upon books, works of art and like matter inviting attention and approval
of the public, might be called the "critic's pnvilege." The rationale for the "public
interest" privilege, as noted above, is the need to encourage public discussion upon
these subjects.31 The rationale commonly given for the "critic's privilege" is that
25

Hallen, supra note 7; 1 HARPR
op. cit.
26 supra note 8, § 110.

& JAm.s, op. cit. supra note 8, § 5.28; PRosszt,

See cases, supra note 7. See also Cohalan v. New York Tribune, 172 Misc. 20, 15
N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (judge); Oliveros v. Henderson, 116 S.C. 77, 106 S.E.
855 (1929)
(juror).
2

7 Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F Supp. 916, motion for new trial dented,
242 F Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Cherry v. Des Momes Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86
N.W 323 (1901); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139

(1930); Adolph Philipp Co. v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 165 App. Div. 377, 150 N.Y.

Supp. 1044 (1914); Lyon v. Daily Telegraph, Ltd., [19431 K.B. 746 (C.A.); McQuire
v. Western
Morning News Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 100 (C.A.).
28
Dowling v. Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N.W 225 (1896).
29 Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942). As long ago as 1808, Lord Ellenborough charged an English jury that "every man who publishes a book commits himself
to the judgment of the public and any one may comment on his performance." Sir

John Carr, Knight v. Hood, Court of King's Bench at Nisi Pnus (1808), discussed m
Hallen, supra note 7, at 44. See also Dibdin v. Swan & Bostock, 1 Esp. 27, 170 Eng.
Rep. 3269
(1793).
0
"In point of time, among the subjects which are now recognized as involving
legitimate public interest, literary criticism first enjoyed complete liberty." Veeder,
Freedom
of Public Discuss-on, 23
3

HARv.

L. BnEv. 413, 414 (1910).

l Termmello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948). In the opinion Mr. Justice Douglas
pointed out that a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
disputes and free speech may best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest and creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are.

One of the earliest American cases on candidates is Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass.
163 (1808), where the court said:
And when any man shall consent to be a candidate for a public office conferred by the election of the people, he must be considered as putting his character m issue, so far as it may respect his fitness and qualification for the office.
And publications of the truth on this subject, with the honest intention of
informing the people are not a libel. For it would be unreasonable to conclude
that the publication of truths, which it is the interest of the people to know,
should be an offence against their laws.
For the same reason, the publication of falsehood and calumny against
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the entertainer or artist or author has invited comment in putting his material before the public and has, in a sense, prospectively consented to whatever criticism
should be forthcoming. 32 Division of the fair comment privilege into a "public
interest privilege" and a "critics privilege" should prove helpful in considering possible extensions of the Sullivan rule.
Sullivan Construed
In Pauling v. News Syndicate Co.,38 a dictum by Judge Friendly gives some
indication of the "public interest" matters which might be included in an extension
of Sullivan. Dr. Lmus Pauling, the noted scientist and Nobel Peace Prize winner,
brought an action for libel based upon an allegedly defamatory commentary in a
New York Daily News editorial dealing with Dr. Pauling's reaction to the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing by the Soviet Umon in 1961. The court
held that it was not error for the lower court to submit to the jury the question of
whether the editorial was defamatory.3 4 Judge Friendly saw a possible application
of Sullivan to the facts of the Paulingcase and, after noting that the Sullivan holding only recognized a privilege of commenting upon official conduct, stated that:
Although the public official is the strongest case for the constitutional compulsion
of such a privilege, it is questionable whether in principle the decision can be so
limited. A candidate for public office would seem an inevitable candidate for
in public debate
Once that extension was made, the participant
extension
35
on an issue of grave public concern would be next in line.
A New York decision, Gilberg v. Goffli, 36 seems to support Judge Friendly's
broad interpretation of the Sullivan case. In Gofl, a law partner of the mayor of
Mount Vernon brought an action alleging that he had been defamed in a speech
made by a candidate for the office of alderman. In his speech the candidate had
said that there should be an investigation to determine whether the mayor's law firm
was practicing in city courts under conditions raising a conflict of interest. The
court stated that "the doctrine proclaimed in the New York Times case is dispositive of all the legal issues, actual or potential, here presented"37 and entered summary judgment for the defendant. The court found that the plaintiff had not proved
that the speech directly concerned and slandered him by name or by association
with the mayor's law firn. 38 In rejecting plaintiffs contention that Sullivan does
not apply to one who is not a candidate for public office and is outside the political
public officers, or candidates for public offices, is an offence most dangerous
to the people, and deserves punishment
Id. at 2169.
a3Dowling v. Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N.W 225 (1896).
33 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964).
34 Id. at 671.
35 Ibid. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Supreme Court extended
the Sullivan precedent to a criminal libel prosecution, stating that upon the principles
of the Sullivan case the Louisiana statute, as applied, was unconstitutional because it
directed punishment for a true statement made with actual malice.
36 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964).
37 Id. at 526, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
38 Id. at 524-25, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 829-30. The mayor and the plaintiff practiced
together under the name "Singnano & Gilberg."
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arena, the court said that the plaintiff had "made himself as much a part of the
local political campaign as did ins law partner, the Mayor"3 9 and hIs right to recover damages was therefore limited by the rule announced in Sullivan. The court
stated that the plaintiffs personal and individual status had become "inextricably
interwoven" with that of the law firm. 40 By thus making the law firm the "thing"
defamed the case seems to stand for the proposition that the Sullivan privilege
will immunize falsehoods defaming private persons where those falsehoods were
directed at public officials with whom the private persons were closely associated.
In the New York case of Spahn v. Julia Messner, Inc.,41 a well-known baseball
pitcher brought an invasion of privacy action against the author and publisher of
an unauthorized biography. The court held that the book violated the right to
privacy provisions of the New York Civil Bights Law, 42 awarded damages, and
enjoined further distribution of the book. The defendants maintained that, in light
of Sullivan, freedom of the press is absolute and that the New York statutory right
4
of privacy, if applied to the author or publisher of a biography, is unconstitutional.
44
Sullivan was not applied in the Spahn case, and it was observed that the Supreme
Court explicitly limited its decision in Sullivan to actions brought by public offlcals against critics of their oflical conduct.4 5 The court stated that "to so classify
Freedom of the Press as an unconditionally absolute right would inexorably relegate other rights to a deferred position." 46
Two months after the Spahn case a New York Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the scope of Sullivan in an action involving another sports figure. In
Dempsey v. Time, Inc. 47 the former heavyweight boxing champion Jack Dempsey
brought an action for libel based upon a story in Sports Illustrated which alleged
that the boxer had used loaded gloves to win the championship from Jess Willard
in 1919. In denying a motion to dismiss, the court took the position that the
language of Sullivan was limited to the criticism of the official conduct of public
officials 48 and, noting the Pauling dictum, stated:
It is the opinon of this court that the reaching back 45 years, as was done in the
instant case, is not within the purview of even the suggested extension of the
New York Times case, so as to cloak the described event with a veil of privilege.
This court is not prepared to hold that because of the mere fact that one is a
public idividual, he may be exposed to naked libel, unless the classical factors
49
which serve to abate or mitigate the otherwise tortious act are also present.
In Canon v. justice Court,50 the California Supreme Court had occasion to
comment upon the Sullivan case. The opinion dealt with the jurisdiction of a
s9 Id. at 526, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
40 ibtd.
4143 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
42 N.Y. Civ. PiaGrrs LAw §§ 50, 51.
43 43 Misc. 2d at 223, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 534-35.
44 Id. at 223-24, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
45 Ibid.
40 Id. at 224, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
4743 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
48 Id. at 756-57, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89.
49 Id. at 756-57, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
50 61 Cal. 2d 446, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428 (1964).
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justice court to hear a cause under Califorma Elections Code section 12047, which
makes it a msdemeanor to print or distribute anonymous campaign literature.5 1 In
dictum, the court noted that the right of free expression under the first amendment
is not absolute 52 but that there is great value in permitting comment on the official
54
conduct of government officials. 53 The court italicized "official conduct" M com-

menting upon Sullivan's protection of "vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks" 55 and apparently considered the Sullivan doctrine to
apply only to public officials. A federal court in Walker v. Courer-Journal and
Louisville Times Co.,56 relying upon Sullivan and its progeny, recently dismissed a
libel suit brought by former Major General Edwin A. Walker against two Louisville newspapers and a radio station. Walker charged that the defendants libeled
him in recounting Ins activities at Oxford, Mississippi during the 1962 demonstrations over the admission of a Negro to the university. In dismissing the action the
court stated that Walker would have to prove actual malice to recover.5r Inasmuch
as Walker was not a public official at the time of the alleged libel, the ruling is
the broadest extension of the Sullivan privilege to date. In the Walker opinion
Judge Gordon stated that in order for Sullivan to "have any meaning the protections must be extended to other categories of individuals or persons involved in
the area of public debate or who have become involved in matters of public concem."58 He noted that Walker was a person of "political prominence" who had
interwoven his personal status with that of a public one and had thereby become
the subject of substantial press, radio and television news comment, thus magmfying the chance that his activities would be erroneously reported. Observing that
public debate cannot be "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" if the news media
are compelled to stand legally in awe of error in reporting the words and actions
of prominent persons who involve themselves in matters of grave public concern,
the court concluded that the protective "public official" doctrine of actual malice
announced in Sullivan well applies to Walker, the "public man."59
While the Walker case extends Sullivan to persons not holding public office, a
recent ruling by a New York Supreme Court 69 indicates that, within the ranks of
public officers, Sullivan is not necessarily limited to elected officials or to officials in
51

The court held the statute to be unconstitutional in that it infringed the right of
free speech of individuals other than Califorma voters. Id. at 460, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 236,
393 P.2d at 436.
52 Id. at 457, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 234, 393 P.2d at 434.
5s Ibzd.
54

Ibid.

55
New
5

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
6Walker v. Couner-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky.
1965).
67 In finding no actual malice the court called attention to the fact that the information published by the defendants was furnished by national news gathering agencies and
was widely printed throughout the country. It was stated that reliance upon such reports
was not that reckless disregard for factual accuracy necessary to support an action for
libel. It was also noted that promptness and dispatch are important in iforming the
public and may lead to unintentional error. Id. at 235.
58 Id. at 233.
59 Id.at 234.
00 Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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the upper echelons of public service. Thomas R. Gilligan, a New York City police
lieutenant who attained national prominence after he shot and killed a 15-yearold Negro, fSled a libel action against civil rights leaders, alleging that he had been
falsely accused of murder. Gilligan had been exonerated of criminal charges in
both grand jury and departmental investigations. In denying a defense motion to
dismiss on the basis of Sullivan, Justice N. T. Helman ruled that Gilligan qualifies
as a public official because of the promnence of the incident and therefore must
prove actual malice in order to recover damages. 61
Potential Extensions
The portent of the holdings and dicta to date which have attempted to circumscribe the bounds of the Sullivan privilege is not altogether clear. Keeping in mind
the differences in the public activities of the plaintiffs in these cases and recalling
the distinction between a "public interest" privilege and a "critic's privilege," it
should be possible to set forth some of the arguments likely to be urged in support
of either limitation or extension of Sullivan.
The basis for immunity from liability by reason of privilege is that some interest
is to be served by according the privilege.62 It would seem reasonable, then, to
say that the import of the interest should determine the scope of the privilege.
An illustration may serve to clarify this statement. Both a sports page feature on
the "Rookie of the Year" and an editorial commentary on the "Voting Record of
Senator X" would attract the interest of many readers of a newspaper. But surely
the column on the Senator deals with a subject of greater importance to the citizenry than the column concerning a "Rookie"-or a Spahn or a Dempsey. The
Senator is engaged in the making of law and policy which determine the nature of
our government and wlch, in turn, shape our social structure. The vesting of such
power in elected representatives creates a corresponding need to inform the electorate of the activities of their representatives. Thus, while the column on the Senator
and that concerning the "Rookie" are both "interesting" in the sense that they
attract the reader's attention, it must be said that it is functionally more important
for the public to be informed about the activities of its elected official than to
know of the rookie's batting average or of Ins off-the-field domestic problems.
This is the interest that should be determinative of the scope of the privilege.
Suppose the sports writer errs and unintentionally writes that the rookie's batting
average is .200 when, in fact, it is .300. The player's reputation is damaged in
the minds of those who accept the colummst's figures as the truth, but it is most
unlikely that the incident would affect the lives of many members of the public.
Certainly the need of the public to know the rookie's batting average is not so
predominant that even unintentionally defamatory misstatements must be immunized from suit m order that the public be kept currently and broadly informed
on this subject. 63 Conversely, there is a need that the public be kept informed
of the activities of Senator X and should a newspaper inadvertently publish the
statement that the Senator voted for abolition of a controversial clause in an existing
01 Id. at 216, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
62
Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148 (1957).
63 For cases involving sports figures, see Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F Supp.
916 (N.D. Ga. 1964), motion for new trial dented, 242 F Supp. 390 (motion was based
on Sullivan); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Prnting Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930).
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act, while the opposite was the truth, the statement is, under Sullivan, presumably
not actionable. The interest here, the need of the public to know, is of such inportance that even the occasional false statement of fact merits protection.
These illustrations show extremes of interest. But while the rookie's public
activities would come within the "critic's privilege" because it is something done
before the public for its approval, it does not follow that any book, play, entertainment or the like is similarly deficient in the sort of interest wlch merits the protection of a privilege such as that announced in Sullivan.
A book by a former president on the subject of what our foreign policy should
be, or a play which explores a current social question-abortion, the effects of discrimmation, or whatever-or a treatise on the preservation of our natural resources,
would be of greater import than the rookie, a musical comedy, or a book about
gardening. The material on foreign policy, abortion, discrimination, or natural resources will play a part in determining policies or attitudes on these subjects,
whereas the other materials primarily serve to entertain or provide diversion.
While it would be foolhardy to attempt wholly to enumerate the subjects which
are of such interest that they might warrant protection such as that afforded the
critics of public officials by Sullivan, these examples should serve to indicate that
these are materials within the area of the "critic's privilege" which clearly fall in the
area between the extremes of the senator's activities and those of the rookie and
which may be of such interest as to warrant a privilege of the order of Sullivan.
Protecting the Victim's Interests
The strongest argument for strictly limiting Sullivan would seem to be the possibility that innocent reputations may be severely damaged and the victims may be
left without redress for their injuries. The Sullivan court clearly indicated that a
statement made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its
veracity is outside the privilege, 4 and it is therefore unlikely that an extension
of Sullivan to the "critic's privilege" would lead to a reckless or irresponsible press.
But it must be remembered that even a negligent statement within an extended
privilege could do great damage. Reputations are of value, and the size of jury
awards ui some defamation actions brought recently would seem to indicate that
disparagement of the reputation of another is considered a grave matter entitling
the victim to large damage awards and visiting the defamer with the burden of
heavy punitive damages.0 5 While the size of past awards should not determine the
development of future law, the public sentiment evidenced by these awards is
apparent. The danger that the reputations of innocent persons might be discredited
would appear to be sufficient cause for refusing to extend Sullivan into many areas
of the "critic's privilege." If the object of criticism is primarily a form of entertainat 280.
Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F Supp. 916 (N.D. Ca. 1964) (jury
verdict for $3,060,000 reduced to $460,000 as alternative to new trial); Reynolds v.
Pegler, 123 F Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 846 (1955) ($1 actual damages, $175,000 punitive damages); Chagnon v.
Umon Leader Corp., 103 N.H. 426, 174 A.2d 825 (1961) ($99,000 award of general
damages sustained); Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1963) (award of $3,500,000 reduced to $400,000 compensatory damages plus $150,000
punitive damages). See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 218, 237 (1954).
64 376 U.S.
05See, e.g.,
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ment-a symphony series, an intercollegiate football match, a book about old cons,
or a movie about the animal kingdom-it is manifest that there is not that reference to current social or political questions which would vest in the object an
interest meriting optimum protection.
If the "critic's privilege" of fair comment is narrowed so that it encompasses
only materials which are created primarily to entertain or to provide diversion and
which do not deal with subjects of pressing social or political importance, the
deficiency of a protection-meriting interest and of a corresponding need to protect
private reputations would seem to preclude any extension of Sullivan in this direction. Materials dealing with social or political questions must properly be classified
as materials within a "public interest" privilege. It is to the questions of which
matters courts nught find to be of such interest as to deserve the larger privilege
and of the prospects of extending Sullivan to protect "honest mistakes" in those
areas that we now turn.
Probability of Extenstons
As noted, a privilege of the scope of Sullivan must be founded upon an interest
common to the general public and not be limited to the personal interest of a
few individuals. As indicative of which matters might be affected with this greater
interest, consider first this statement from the Coleman v. MacLennan66 decision,
a case cited in both the Walker and Sullivan opinions:
[T]he correct rule, whatever it is, must gover in eases other than those involving candidates for office. It must apply to all officers and agents of governmentmunicipal, state and national; to the management of all public mstitutions--educational, charitable, and penal; to the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected
with a public interest-transportation, banking, insurance; and to innumerable
other subjects involving the public welfare.6 7
Sullivan also quotes Coleman to the effect that the "good faith" privilege "extends to a great variety of subjects and includes matters of public concern, public
men, and candidates for office."68 While the Sullivan holding was narrow, the
Court did state, in footnote 23, that "we have no occasion here
to specify
categories of persons who would or would not be included." It is submitted that
this footnote and these quotations form a foundation upon which a court, as in
the Walker case, may construct an extension of the Sullivan precedent.
The principal argument for extending Sullivan is that there are matters of
public interest in just as much need of exposure and discussion as the activities of
our public governors and that these too merit the larger privilege in order to encourage such comment and discussion. 69 When the activities of a small town mayor
0678 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
6rid. at

734-35, 98 Pac. at 289 (1908).

68 376 U.S. 254, 281-82, quoting from Coleman, supra note 66, at 723, 98 Pac.

at 285.
69 A forceful argument for a privilege of "honest mistake" was made by Justice
Cooley in a Michigan Supreme Court case where he dissented, stating, in part:
[T]he beneficial ends to be subserved by public discussion would in large measure be defeated if dishonesty must be handled with delicacy and fraud spoken
of with such circumspection and careful and deferential choice of words as to
make it appear in the discussion a matter of indifference.
[If
the author were obliged to justify every statement by evidence of
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are contrasted with a national controversy among scientists, statesmen, religious
leaders, professors and other public figures upon development of our nuclear
capabilities, involvement m foreign military actions, or dissemination of birth control information, the latter are seen to be of greater public interest, not merely in
relation to the number of people involved, but also m relation to the social significance of the issues. And yet, even the former has been held privileged. Therefore,
if it is the size of the interest which is to determine the scope of the privilege, it
seems logical that the Sullivan privilege should be extended to other matters of
public concern.
To the extent that the Sullivan privilege is extended it will abrogate the troublesome need to distinguish between fact and comment in determining liability.70
Under present law-excepting, of course, the former area of liability immunized by
Sullivan-a false statement of fact is not entitled to protection because it is not
considered to be, in any sense, opmion. 71 Tins makes it necessary for a court to
separate fact from opinion in order to determine whether the defendant has merely
made an illogical inference from harmless facts and thereby libeled "hnself rather
than the subject of his remarks" 72 or has subjected himself to liability by exceeding
the pnvilege.73 The distinction is normally predicated upon whether ordinary per-

sons exposed to the statement would understand it as an expression of the commumcator's opinion or as a direct statement of existing facts, not on whether the
communication was actually opinion or fact.74 While this rule appears workable
on paper, it has proven difficult to apply in court.7 5 In any case held to come within
the Sullivan privilege the court need only determine whether the statement was
made "honestly" with belief in its veracity or with "knowledge that it was false"
its literal truth, the liberty of public discussion would be unworthy of being

named as a privilege of value

[R]eputation is best protected when the

press is free. Impose shackles upon it and the protection fails when the need is
greatest. Who would venture to expose a swindler or a blackmailer, or to give in
detail the facts of a bank failure or other corporate defalcation, if every word
and sentence must be uttered with judicial calmness and impartiality as between
the swindler and his victims, and every fact and every inference be justified by
unquestionable legal evidence?
Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press, 46 Mich. 341, 382-84, 9 N.W 501, 523-24 (1881). This
case was decided upon questions of pleading and evidence and the majority opinion
omitted any discussion of privilege.
There are a few American cases, not involving public officials, where the courts
have apparently recognized a privilege of "honest mistake." See Brokmg v. Phoenix Newspapers, 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P.2d 413 (1953); Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 Ad. 411
(1896); McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W 878 (1920). But see Pattangall v.
Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 AUt. 561 (1915), apparently limiting Bearce.
70For a general discussion of this problem see: HAiRPER, ToRTs 543 (1933);
Pnosszn, TORTS 815-16 (3d ed. 1964); Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of
Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1203 (1962); Note,

62 HAiv.
L. Rzv. 1207 (1949).
71
72

HARPER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 543.
Popham v. Pickbum, 7 H. & N. 891, 898, 158 Eng. Rep. 730, 733 (Ex. 1862).

73 HARPE,
74 Id.

op. cit. supra note 70, at 544.

at 543; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 814-15.
75
See, e.g., Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Hotz v. Alton Telegraph
Printing Co., 324 Ill. App. 1, 57 N.E.2d 137 (1944); Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353,
83 N.W 110 (1900).
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NOTES

e 76
as to indicate actual
or such "reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"
77
malice. Inasmuch as a defendant accused of "actual malice" would be obliged, as
a practical matter, if not as a matter of law, to present some grounds for an
"honest belief," it is this writer's opinion that a ]ury would be more able to determine whether the alleged defamer spoke or wrote "honestly" with a belief in what
was stated than to draw fine distinctions in particular instances between fact and
opnon-a distinction possibly illusory.78 Often, under present law, liability hinges
only upon this distinction,7 9 and any development in the law of defamation which
would substitute for that distinction one more practicable would be an improvement.80
While the first amendment gives no license to defame, 8 ' it could be interpreted
to give constitutional status to an extension of the Sullivan privilege. Much of the
case law relied upon by the Supreme Court in its discussion of the first amendment
in Sullivan appears to be as applicable to statements about non-office-holding
public figures as it is to the criticism of public officers.
The Sullivan Court extracted from Roth v. United States82 the statement that
the first amendment was "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for

the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." As mdicative of the scope of the freedom of expression, the Court quoted from a 1941
on all
opnion83 that "it is a prized Amencan privilege to speak one's mind
public institutions." Reference was also made to a 1927 concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Brandeis which reaffirmed freedom of expression as a fundamental principle
of American government.8 4 Before specifically discussing the criticism of public
officials, the Court observed that there is a profound commitment in this country
to the principle that debate on public issues should be "uninhibited, robust, and
76 376 U.S. at 280.
77
Inasmuch as the Sullivan Court defined actual malice as being a statement made
with knowledge that it was "false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not," ibid., it appears that a falsehood might be stated "honestly" (in that the writer or
speaker believed it to be true) with some ill will, but without defeating the privilege.
This would not be a new direction in the law of defamation. See Fahr v. Hayes, 50
N.J.L. 275, 13 Atl. 261 (1898). Cf. Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W 878
(1910); Gerlach v. Gruett, 175 Wis. 354, 185 N.W 195 (1921). See also RESTATEMENT,
TonTs § 603, comment a (1938); Evans, Legal Immunity for Defamation, 24 MN14N.
L. P~v.
607 (1940).
78
Titus, supra note 68, at 1215-22.
79 See generally Note, 62 HA.v. L. REv. 1212-15.
80 There is, of course, no immunity for deliberate falsehoods under existing law. See
National Cash Register Co. v. Salling, 173 Fed. 22 (9th Cir. 1909); Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Fuller, 190 Ark. 426, 79 S.W.2d 736 (1935); Caldwell v. Personal Finance Co. of St.
Petersburg, 46 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1950); Lawless v. Muller, 99 NJ.L. 9, 123 Atl. 104
(1923).
81
DouOLAs, THE MRIGH oF =x PEoPLE 31 (1958).
82 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
3 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
84
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927). The Sullivan Court also
relied on Judge Learned Hand's statement that the first amendment "presupposes that
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than
through any land of authoritative selection." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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wide-open."8 5 While the Court's subsequent discussion8 6 of the constitutional protection required for factual misstatement dealt only with the criticism of public
officers, the language used m its preliminary discussion of the constitutional questions raised by Sullivan seems to extend to comment upon any matter of legitimate
public concern. It certainly does not appear that an enlargement along Sullivan
lines of the qualified privilege now afforded those who comment on matters of public interest other than the activities of public officials would be rebuked by the
Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The adoption by the Supreme Court of what had been a minority rule has
given constitutional status to a long-debated doctrine. The vaned dicta and holdmngs m the cases which have considered Sullivan indicate that courts throughout
the country are struggling to define the boundaries of the new privilege.
While the fair comment privilege has historically protected the right of a critic
to criticize plays, books, public sporting events and anything else submitted to the
public for its approval, it is improbable that the Sullivan privilege will be extended
to apply to comment upon materials which are designed primarily to entertain or
provide diversion, for such comment is not ordinarily fundamental to the continued
responsiveness of our social and political institutions and it therefore does not
encompass that interest which merits the larger privilege.
However, inasmuch as the purpose of the "honest mistake" rule announced in
Sullivan is to encourage public discussion and thereby develop public awareness,
immunity from liability for publication of an "honest mistake" is in order, at least
m theory, where the subject being commented upon is of such social or political
importance that an optimum of free discussion is desirable. Therefore if an author,
for example, involves himself m controversies about foreign policy or civil rights
or some other subject m the "public interest" sphere, the rational bass underlying
the Sullivan decision would seem to support an extension of the "honest mistake"
privilege to commentary upon this material.
An almost certain extension, as noted m the Pauling opinon, will be to candidates, whose qualifications would seem to be as much a matter of public interest as
those of incumbent officials. Extension to protect comment made upon "public
figures"--as in the Walker decision m Kentucky and the Gilligan ruling in New
York-also seems likely, at least to the extent that the public figure is involved m
a legitimate matter of public interest.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the Sullivan rule applies only to honest
nusstatements of fact and affords no protection for the deliberate or reckless defamer. Extension of the Sullivan privilege will grant to none a license to defame.
To extend Sullivan is to safeguard the freedoms of expression by taking cognizance
of the fact that even the most punctilious of commentators may occasionally err:
[T]o argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements
all this, even to the most
of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opimon
aggravated degree, is so continually done m perfect good faith, by persons who
are not considered, and m many other respects may not deserve to be considered,
85 376 U.S. at 270.
s6 Id. at 271-78.

